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In short, the interpsychic exchange Bolognini, ; is a natural and shareable process in a condition of mutual understanding and interaction between two human beings. A good interpretation is something like that. Many artists are strongly subjective in spite of a low definition — at least partially — of their boundaries as persons.

The two are able to exchange interior contents both bodily and emotional through their specific organs going into and out of the internal world, covered by the membranes mucosa , that facilitate the passage of the contents from outside to inside, and vice versa Bolognini, As analysts, we take into account these bodily relations, initially experienced with a low level of mentalization but with a high degree of imprinting, will work as further intrapsychic equivalents mainly at a preconscious level as happens, i. And we know that the way the preconscious is connected or not connected with the conscious is a fundamental, characteristic element of each individual intrapsychic life, on one hand, and of each individual inter-psychic attitude on the other hand Bollas, Of course, among the many concepts involved in the interpsychic functioning, one has to specially mention the transitional area, which makes the intersubjective cohabitation liveable, thanks to its protective action so that the Self is not traumatically invaded by the Not-Self; it allows the individual to afford sustainable interactions between two psychic apparatuses, without any reciprocal experience of violation.

Another important point is that in the interpsychic exchange there is no confusion: a pre-subjective and co-subjective area of sensations, feelings and thoughts can be shared, while maintaining at the same time and at other levels, with undissociated continuity, individual ways of psychic functioning, characterized by a condition of good-enough separateness Guss Teicholz, The other lady replies in a friendly way, tuning into the same wavelength; and so begins a little impromptu dialogue, a casual one, based on the practice of commenting out loud.

But, note, this is not the blind, disturbed and often disturbing speech of the psychotic who does not recognize otherness: here the otherness is clearly recognized, it is just that the possibility of exchanging considerations, which become the topic of an exchange in an intermediate space, is perceived and taken for granted as implicitly accepted and acceptable, provided those considerations are sufficiently generic, hopefully shareable in that they are based on common sense, and not intrusive for the other person, even though they are expressed in a colourful way.

So, little by little, the world becomes an easier place to live together and to live in; the conversation lasts for a few stops usually along the diagonal streets that criss-cross the city centre and at the end of the line, the first lady to get off the bus will politely bid farewell to the other, but without exchanging names and most likely without remembering any of her distinguishing features.

They will not greet one another the next time they cross paths, because these two people do not know each other. They simply shared a limited and intentionally circumscribed interpsychic area, lasting just a few bus stops. We can see, then, that this was mainly an interpsychic exchange, not an interpersonal relationship.

It concerns a basic functional physiology, in the relationship between two mental apparatuses, which does not necessarily mean a constant involvement of more. It is not necessarily true, therefore, that in an analytical phase of significant interpsychic contact the analyst is able to answer intersubjectively on the basis of a strong cohesion of the Self.

I have witnessed occasional interpsychic exchanges also with schizophrenics; in those cases the subjectivity was not cohesive at all, and yet it happened that "the mouth opened for eating and something could go in", in an occasionally natural way. In short, this was in the interpsychic, not in the intersubjective; nor was there any interaction as people, "in a highly personal way" Greenberg, , with full and official definition of identities.

Thus, in analysis, with a person to whom I feel it is appropriate to propose an increase in the frequency of sessions, I might say: "So, Mr. Bianchi: here we are. Do we want to add a fourth session, after we have worked extensively at three sessions a week? With a subject, however, I might say: "If we added a fourth session, do you feel that this could help you? Bianchi", that is without formally or officially convening the person; instead I devote our care and attention to the subjective and inter-subjective experience that we could share and discover; with emphasis more on the experience of the Self and less on the borders of identity.

In this sense, Judith Guss Teicholz noted how mother-child or analyst-patient interactions entail constant reciprocal regulation, but not necessarily constant, explicit reciprocal recognition: which may even be avoided sometimes thanks to such regulation. This does not occur for pathological reasons, but due to a temporary and transitory condition of companionable and cooperative fusionality Bolognini, , a; Fonda, that forms part of the normal, good mental cohabiting of human beings. In those moments the recognition of the separation is not necessary: just as when you are boarding a flight, at the gate, the attendant asks you for your boarding card, but does not ask for your passport again.

In this sense, the image of the "cat-flap", which I used in my book "Secret Passages", comes in handy again as a symbol of something different and intermediate between the opening of the whole and complete "interpersonal" door behind which you find the person and the clandestine breaking-in of the "trans-psychic" cracks exploited by the mice, where the cat is unable to pass.

Through the cracks the person the conscious Central Ego cannot be seen, the cat the Preconscious cannot pass, but the mice can: the intrusive projective identification can then parasitize the Self and replace it at least in part. This is the interesting point: the owner trusted the cat and granted it this freedom of movement: the preconscious and its functions including the procedural ones of our mental way of being are the equivalent of this cat-flap.

The cat-flap is the facilitated passage through which we allow our thoughts to reach us; our sensations to be recorded, perceived and mentalized; and at this cat-flap level we can also use many technical tools, which I will deal with in the conclusion of my presentation today: tools we use with our patients during sessions, "without having to officially open the door" in its entirety.

I am describing a natural, healthy device that we all have and that some of us neurotically block, fearing that instead of the cat goodness knows what else might come in; this device performs a useful regulatory function in many cases, allowing the "intake" between patient and analyst. Analysis "constructs a cat-flap", and "trains the cat" to use it the cat being a portion of the Ego that is quick at intuitions and associations because of its familiarity with the preconscious.

In the interpsychic exchange, we often accept implicitly — but also instinctively, consensually, and with a significant saving of energy — that "the cat" comes and goes, back and forth between ourselves and others. At times we see and notice it, at others we do not; its passing is a natural, non-invasive and non-parasitic event that is not subject to rigid control and that generally does not disturb us. This description, which may seem contradictory when all is said and done, is there or is there not separateness?

As for the relationships between the "interpsychic" and closely-related concepts that in my mind are not exactly coincident ones, such as "empathy" and "projective identification", my view is that they describe different aspects of the same homogeneous relational reality. The "interpsychic" is a highly permeable functional level shared by two psychic apparatuses, which facilitates situations of complex empathy through exchanges based on so-called "normal" M.

Klein, or "communicative" H. Rosenfeld, projective identifications. Empathy is a complex psychic condition, either of the individual or of the pair, which ALSO requires functional interpsychic levels, but not only these, in order to be practicable Bolognini, a, b : figuratively, it requires both the cat-flap and the door. Projective identification — in the conceptual context we are exploring — is a specific mental and relational operation, which in its communicative forms extensively uses interpsychic levels of exchange the preconscious cat-flap and contributes to eventual empathy.

In evacuative or intrusive-parasitic forms, instead, it contributes to pathology and corresponds figuratively to the "forced-entry cracks" exploited by the mice unconscious clandestinity. It is essential to gradually build confidence in the practicability of dialogue with internal worlds; the analytic dialogue, experienced interpsychically "from within", is particularly effective, first in containing and then in symbolizing: what is exchanged may very often be experienced as experientially "true" as in a dream , even though not real.

I believe that all analysts use these minimal tools in their everyday practice, and they do so, more often than not, in a natural, almost instinctive way: these are usually technical tools that pass through the "cat-flap", not because they are unconscious, but because they are essentially and consensually experienced as natural. In them, the modulation of the distinction between Self and Not-Self plays a key role. Although technically "children of a lesser God" and rarely found in analytic literature, these tools deserve nonetheless to be mentioned and described, since they are less banal and less obvious than they might appear.

HOW SO? These are "conversational" questions we habitually or at least sometimes ask patients during their associative flow or associative non-flow, when we feel that something is really missing, or not being said, and so on. I will mention three: a "That is? The third question in this category is even more sneaky and intriguing: c "How so? To all appearances, these technical tools let's call them that, as we are referring to an analytical situation; even if it is clear that these requests are part of the normal daily dialogue between human beings seem destined only to stimulate the patient's Central Ego.

The patient is spurred on to complete a secondary process that was touched on but immediately interrupted, and to clarify the meaning of their reticent, elusive, allusive, incomplete or otherwise incomprehensible communication. In reality, the relational aspect evoked by these brief expressions "That is? First of all, the object the analyst is animated and expresses an interest in the thoughts and the feelings of the other.

Another key point, however, is that these kinds of question "That is? If they are not presented in a superego-ish way, they appear to come "from the same height" and not from above; the modulation of "sameness" and "otherness" is crucial in this game. Asking, in these cases, is a clear exercise of humility and realism; the display of knowing how to ask intrinsically offers the other in this case, the patient a contact with the sustainability of not knowing, without this corresponding to a narcissistic disqualifying defeat. Thus, it is commonly observed how in many cases offering a partial symmetry contained within the asymmetry, of course with a proposal such as: " This position by the analyst shows an underlying calmness and security, and the patient gets to experience this through more than just a cognitive notification to the Central Ego.

I also want to emphasize that I am not dealing with this aspect from an ethical point of view, but from a technical point of view: not whether it is morally "right" or not, but rather what effects it can produce. The question: " How so? It proposes an exploratory ulteriority that does not directly charge the patient with reticence, unlike "That is…?

The analyst, in this case, is more openly investigative than overtly unprepared, and does not pay a particular narcissistic price for this request. If the analyst asks, "How so? Beyond these finer relational aspects, however, the fact remains that in all these cases,.

Naturally, it should be borne in mind that the step from this to being intrusive and persecutory can be a short one. Coaches should get to know their pupils, so that they are able to ask them for a sustainable effort without taking them to the breaking point. Curiously, it is to Irwin Yalom and his historical textbook on group analysis that I owe my first interest in this technical tool, which he called the "universality of experience".

After all, even if the group dimension can evoke a potentially greater sharing of experiences, the pair relationship in analysis is equally affected by this process, which significantly reduces the gap between "sameness" and "otherness". As we shall see, the fact that this relational event is commonly found in human. So, what is this impersonal pronoun? The impersonal pronoun is the extension of the patient's experience to all human beings, as common to their condition, limiting the apparent abnormality and at times reshaping the pathological characterization.

One of the greatest fears of many patients is that what they are experiencing is in itself evidence of a severe and untreatable pathology. The attenuation of the difference between Self and Not-Self, when the impersonal pronoun is used, greatly reduces the anxieties of confrontation, judgment, inferiority, indignity, and unacceptability. The idea that, under certain circumstances, the internal effects that are experienced can be reasonably attributed to understandable processes of life makes it possible to examine them in a more thoughtful and analytical way.

The quality of the experience can be explored in a deeper and more humanized way and the control by the Defensive Ego is made less obsessive: We use the impersonal pronoun in the session when it is useful to modulate this universality of experience. The professor repeatedly and stubbornly tries to draw the bow in a deliberate and controlled manner, to no avail; then at last, in the grip of despair mixed with fury, the philosopher finally loses control and unexpectedly "lets off" a shot, that he had not planned for in any way, and that sprang from the complex progressive relationship between the subject himself and the object the bow.

This formula cleverly condenses a decrease in the distance between Self and Not-Self, between subject and object; both now appear to float in a shared and universalized dimension; the relationship is not possessive, it is not controlled, it is not intrusive; the center of gravity of the scene is neither on the professor nor on the bow. The Zen Master will later specify that his bow was not directed at the professor, but rather at the event.

I leave to you the appreciation of some significant similarities with the analytic situation; and of course I cannot close this chapter without pointing out that there may also be defensive uses of the impersonal pronoun, for example when it is used to deny individual responsibility. In , R. The "Mmmmh….!

It is certainly a less absolute and less disturbing dimension than the "EMPTY VOID" created by the "hard" silence of the analyst Bolognini, , aimed at "flushing out" the patient's unconscious by destabilizing the Defensive Ego, rather than making it unclench. There are situations where "hard" silence permits the perception and the dramatization of a useful void, open to the exploration of what is new, and where it has a powerful function of "sucking out" the internal contents.

The "Mmmmh! Here is a brief clinical example:. I was in the passenger seat. It was clear that we were going to end up in an expanse of muddy, murky, brown water. The van The "we" is formed in the primary physiological fusionality when this works; instead, it has to be rebuilt when that good fusionality was not sufficiently experienced, or repaired when it has been broken or traumatized. In some cases, this may be a key part of our work: putting back together a basic "we" that coexists with the sense of individuality; always considering, though, this dynamic physiological alternating between the sense of individuality and otherness, on the one hand, and the healthy partial fusionality on the other.

The working alliance will then be one of the potential benefits of this physiological extension of the Self. In conclusion, these five "minimalist" technical tools are daily, ubiquitous and common to all analysts. They deserve a mention despite their apparent aspecificity, since, like the house-cat, they are part of our natural working day. In Correale A. De Psicoanalisis, 55, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino. Libres Cahiers pour la Psychanalyse, 7, Bollati Boringhieri Editore, Torino, Faimberg H. De Mijolla, Paris. Freud S. SE, 7. SE, Green A. Greenson R.

Guss Teicholz J. Kaes R. Paris, Dunod. Relazione al Centro Psicoanalitico di Firenze, Segal H. Yalom I. Basic Books, New York. Widlocher D. Bulletin FEP, Identifizieren-mit und Teilen-mit, Symmetrie und Asymmetrie. In einem ersten Schritt unterscheide ich zwischen interpsychischem und transpsychischem Austausch. Dennoch kann eine. Und wir wissen, dass die Art der Verbindung oder Nicht-Verbindung zwischen Vorbewusstem und Bewussten einerseits ein grundlegendes, charakteristisches Element jedes individuellen intrapsychischen Lebens ist und andererseits ein Element jeder individuellen interpsychischen Haltung Bollas, Er erlaubt dem Individuum, sich fortlaufend Interaktionen zwischen zwei psychischen Apparaten zu leisten, ohne die wechselseitige Erfahrung von Verletzung zu erleben.

Ich habe gelegentlich auch interpsychischen Austausch mit Schizophrenen beobachtet. Wollen wir eine vierte Sitzung hinzunehmen, nachdem wir in den drei Sitzungen pro Woche bereits intensiv gearbeitet haben? Haben Sie an etwas. Anderen als solchen erkennen auch wenn klar ist, dass das Subjekt zumindest zum Teil eine solche Ebene, als fortgeschrittenen Punkt seiner allgemeinem psychischen Entwicklung, erreicht haben sollte.

Die Katzenklappe ist der vereinfachte Durchgang, durch den wir unseren Gedanken Zugang zu uns erlauben, und durch den unsere Empfindungen erfasst, wahrgenommen und mental verarbeitet werden. Rosenfeld, , projektiven Identifikationen basieren. Der spezifische und gezielt technische Gebrauch des Interpsychischen geschieht, glaube ich, relativ selten. Um ihn zu nutzen, muss eine Analytikerin vor allem in sehr gutem Kontakt mit sich selbst und dann mit der Innenwelt und dynamischen. Der Patient wird angespornt,.

Deshalb ist das Nachfragen hier nicht so eine narzisstische Herabsetzung des Analytikers. Manchmal gibt es einen subtilen aber deutlichen Unterschied zwischen gesundem Menschenverstand und analytischer Technik, auch wenn es. Beide scheinen nun in einer geteilten und universalisierten Dimension zu schweben; die Beziehung ist nicht besitzergreifend, sie ist nicht kontrolliert, sie ist nicht eindringend. Das Gravitationszentrum der Szene ist weder der Professor noch der Bogen. Das geschieht in einem Zustand nichtverwirrender Verschmelzung, in dem die Unterscheidung zwischen dem Selbst und dem Anderen verschwommen wird.

Der Lieferwagen Wurde diese gute Verschmelzung aber nicht hinreichend erfahren, muss sie wiederaufgebaut werden; wurde sie verletzt oder traumatisiert, muss sie repariert werden. Libres Cahiers pour la Psychoanalyse, 7, Teoria e tecnica dell'interpsichico. English edition: Secret Passages. In Dictionnaire International de la Psychanalyse. Fonda P. Gaddini E. Int J. Goldberg A. Greenberg J. JAPA, 49, n. In Esplorazioni psicoanalitiche, Bollati Boringhieri, Hartmann H. International Universities Press, New York.

Herrigel E. Jacobson E. Klein M. Losso R. Percorsi teorico-clinici. Franco Angeli, Milano. Micati L. Racamier P. Payot, Paris. Rosenfeld H. Tavistock Publications, London. With the title "Inside Babel" I wanted to elucidate on which pole of the field of tension between 'Inside and Beyond' I wish to focus.

As 'Inside' there are already enough problems, but definitely potentials, which one needs to keep in mind if one wants to look 'Beyond'. The aspect of the Babel-story that interests me particularly is that moment of the diversity of languages, at times experienced as a confusion of languages. The presumptuous ambition of the people of Babel wanting to rise up to God is a motive we can find again in various forms in the sciences today. A tower is no longer supposed to be built, but God's construction plan of the world is supposed to be decoded, 'God particles' have already been found.

In psychoanalysis, we are currently living in this language diversity, thus 'Inside Babel'. This diversity is, of course, not due to God's punishment, but to the scientific, historic and cultural developments. And it was not our aspiration to rise up to God, our aspiration was and is much smaller, yet not immodest: to understand how the human psyche functions. The term 'Babylonian language confusion' has been used by us for a long time to describe that one can easily lose the overview in the face of the increasing diversity.

But one has to distinguish: confusion can, of course, arise when matters become too complex, but also when the willingness is missing to be able to take the diversity and cope with it. Which aspect is working in the individual case, is difficult to say. In Babel, there are conflicts because of the disturbed communication. But they certainly do not have to be carried out in such an extreme fashion as narrated in some Hebrew variants of the Babel-mythology, where other-speaking tower workers were slain if they did not understand work orders any more see Ranke-Graves et al.

The use of language, for one, is not always as harmless as it might appear. National anthems are musical keywords. Only think of the sad fame which the German word 'Untermensch' has gained; or of the highly sensitive nature of an aspect in the current. Koestler continues: "Each language acts as a connecting force within the group, and as a repellent force between different groups" ibid. Regrettably, this is the case. And it is indeed difficult to be optimistic in a world in which the disintegrating and aggressive forces are so dominant.

Nevertheless, in psychoanalysis I would want to give the connecting forces a chance and thus the positive potentials of the diversity: not least of all, because we have a common ground in our subject 'psyche' and in the specific access to it. I would like to make a snapshot, a kind of inventory of some aspects of this analytic discourse in Babylonian times. In this, I see our analytic Babel as a mythological place. Behind its walls, "Inside Babel", a lot of things can happen, constructive as well as destructive ones.

I would like to invite you on a stroll through this town, walk through old and new neighbourhoods and across the squares, and collect impressions, and simply look at what interesting, pleasant, but also unpleasant things one can encounter there. Many voices in psychoanalysis - constructive and destructive aspects.

Psychoanalysis, empirically and theoretically, is working with one of the most difficult research subjects. Up to this day there is no consensus about what the human psyche is at all and how it functions. However, in psychoanalysis there is, by all means, a number of traditions of thought, which, based on their specific models of the psyche, have developed their own dialects. By analytic dialect I understand those tradition-specific language games distinguished by having developed a number of their own concepts think of the Kleinian 'projective identification' and by having given specific meaning variants to established concepts 'transference as total situation'.

Behind the many voices in Babel is not only the multitude of analytic ideas of the psyche. Hiding behind it are often different scientific worldviews, which can lead to considerable dissent about how psychoanalysis is scientifically positioned. Diversity of theories, which then shows in the diversity of dialects, is actually quite normal in the sciences; and there is. Different clinical experiences, scientific trends, new ideas and findings influence our dialects, which are moreover interwoven with the societies and cultures in which they are spoken.

Hence, psychoanalysis was and still is under pressure to always calibrate and adjust its ideas about the psyche. Also, our understanding of psychic illness was always in competition with initially that of medicine, today also of genetics, of behavioural and the neuro-sciences. Competition, however, can have many faces: from bitter rivalry including unforgiving otherness up to the constructive search for communication and greatest possible sameness. Babel can be a fighting arena or a place for fertile controversy. If one is optimistic, one can experience the diversity of voices as a resource, the attraction of difference as enrichment.

As it is familiar to us from the regulation of closeness and distance, being constantly confronted with the voices of others not only contours one's own position; with a strengthened identity the readiness to open oneself up to a critical stimulating dialogue increases. If one is pessimistic, one can regard the diversity as a barrier at which not rarely unfair battles are fought, which also not rarely can end in emotional injuries.

In the field of tension between sameness and otherness we encounter different kinds of danger. Otherness can lead into the impasse of anxiety and defence, and thus to devaluation, even exclusion. Sameness can lead to the danger of fusion and thus loss of identity. This dialectic between constructive and destructive moments in all scientific discourses as well as in our analytic Babel, does not surprise us.

At any rate, many of us have been living in this town long enough and will continue to stay there. It would not be bad if we all got along well, with all our various forms of thought and life, our various beliefs and mentalities. After all, there are also conferences taking place "Inside Babel", which is a good sign even if they are called "Beyond Babel?

We are actually a beautiful example here for the population of Babel, as far as the colourfulness of voices is concerned: members of so many analytic societies, working with different scientific and analytic education in different fields of practice. More variety in the analytic profiles is hardly possible. What can divide us, are differences in theory and practice.

Most of us speak that dialect in which they were analytically socialized or in which they now feel at home by belief. As it tends to go with dialects: they signal where you are from and offer a sense of home, 'Heimat'. In the development of our dialects a complicated genealogical tree presents itself. At its branches one often finds important ideas of individual analysts. I do not want to trace this branching historically, but only consider aspects of the "here and now". The dialects which have had the historically most powerful effects derive from our authorities of the founder generations.

Therefore we find in Babel the old Freudian centre of town, surrounded by a number of old-town quarters where Jungians, Adlerians, Kleinians, Lacanians, Bionians etc. Next to many of these old centres there are new neighbourhoods, where a 'Post-' sign is over the entrance, for example Post-Kleinians. Other areas in Babel are named after the dominant perspective on the psyche, whether their inhabitants be object relations or drive theorists, self or ego psychologists, attachment theorists or intersubjectivists.

And certainly there are innumerable single detached houses where pluralists, eclectics, or solitaires live. Altogether, our Babel is a rather colourful city; its map reminds one more of the historically grown Rome than of Manhattan's grid designed on the drawing board. These labels, the analytic quarters in Babel, structure our analytic world for us. We all know: when we speak with colleagues, the use of some concepts has the function of passwords.

Keywords often suffice for us to open a drawer. If a speaker talks about "Alpha or Beta function", the Bion drawer opens out at once. That this can happen even in the case of plain mishearing, a Freudian slip possibly, happened to me recently. When I told a colleague I was working on a paper for a conference titled 'Beyond Babel?

If one has different beliefs, it is understood that one has to talk and argue with one another. On the terrain of science there exists, for this purpose, the traditional institution of 'scientific discourse': a rational and fair competition of arguments with the aim that the most wellfounded position may succeed. This ideal is advocated, but the reality lived is often so far. For, mostly it is about something different, about power and predominance, many want to rule over their own little garden patch.

It is often also about money, positions and titles, about narcissistic gratifications. Not rarely motives like envy, jealousy, dogmatism play a far larger role than they should. Actually a good topic for an analytic social psychology It is always useful to quote Freud, for he, of course, has also pointed out this 'dark side' of ours: "One has Let us concede, that we all have destructive tendencies, that can be observed quite well in our analytic Babel.

The aim of communication or even only an approaching is sometimes, unfortunately, not on the agenda, discourses derail. Wallerstein considers the language barriers in general between Anglo-Saxon and French authors as an important impediment to communication — but can they alone explain the sharpness of the dispute? Green sees behind this — and I think rightly so — basic ideological prejudices. A remark by Otto Kernberg gives us a hint regarding the structure of these prejudices: "cultural dispositions toward empirical research Then, this is also about different scientific worldviews: AngloSaxons are said to be disposed toward empirical research, obviously connected with the claim to generate objective knowledge.

The Latins in turn are said to possess only subjectivistically focused attitudes. The mere and subtle implication that only one of them would actually be a 'real' scientist while the others are not is a similarly not very constructive argument in our intern debates, as to say that someone has no 'analytic identity'. Which influence scientific worldviews can have on our analytic language becomes, by the way, already evident in the Standard Edition. For Freud's original concepts, as GeorgesArthur Goldschmidt was able to show, the following applied: "in German, the psychoanalytic terminology hardly deviates from general language usage" Goldschmidt, , S.

Ricardo Steiner examined the correspondence between Ernest Jones and the Freud translators, the Stracheys, and has shown very clearly how much Jones wished for the translations of Freudian concepts to be rendered in the medical languages of the time, Greek and Latin. This is why, until this day, we speak of 'Ego' and not of 'I', this is why we speak of 'cathexis' and 'anaclitic'. For it was important to Jones that psychoanalysis should understand itself as a 'science' in the Anglo-Saxon sense, as a hard natural science, not as belonging to the soft 'humanities' or 'arts'.

He has, by the way, in his letters always capitalized the word 'Science', a spelling only customary for words like 'Lord' or 'King'. Another scientific hope has left its traces: Similarly to religion, there are also strong monotheistic tendencies in the sciences: one theory, one class of methods should have the capability to explain everything — and this ideally in one language. The hope that leaving behind all communication problems by choosing the clarity of a formal language is in fact then like waiting for the Pentecostal miracle. As we know, Bion, too, found the idea of a formal language for psychoanalysis attractive, he explicitly formulated his concepts in line with these maxims.

Arguments about the 'right' scientific worldview are binding just as many resources inneranalytically as the controversies around the analytic common ground or around the 'one right' psychoanalysis. It is too bad how much "anger and bitterness" — so Green — is produced by this; at a time when it would be so much more important to sharpen the profile of psychoanalysis to the outside, towards other sciences and the interested public. And this would really be worth it. For, if one considers the other, the constructive aspect of the diversity of voices, it becomes clear how lively, interesting, and inspiring it can be in our Babel — and that everyone could learn a lot there, inside and outside of psychoanalysis.

Where are these potentials of Babel? In order to illustrate the potentials, I would like to apply a thought by Goldschmidt to our analytic dialects, which he had developed for languages in general. He writes: "The myth of Babel is the myth of the 'unity' of the human language: you would never know what a language is missing, what it turns away from, what it refuses to say, what is gradually lost, if there were not the others who spoke about it" Goldschmidt, , p.

Each language adapts to just the culture in which it is spoken and lived; and in its turn shapes that culture. What one language cannot grasp, another one is well able to formulate, what is lacking in one language, so Goldschmidt, only becomes visible through the mirroring by another. I recognize a similar pattern in our analytic dialects, which centre around our subject. Two questions can hardly be answered: In which language one can speak about psychic phenomena best, and: in which language the psyche itself actually speaks.

Henri Bergson tells us about the limited possibilities of the psyche to express in language what is happening within it. It will inevitably return to the concept, by adding, at the most, an image to it. But then the language has to widen the concept, make it pliant and suggest — by the dissipating boundary with which the language surrounds it — that the concept does not contain the complete experience Bergson, , p. And Goldschmidt adds, referring to the possibilities to speak about the psyche, "All languages are equi-distant from that which is meant, just in different ways" , p.

Each of our dialects, of our attempts to grasp the psychic phenomena, leaves gaps — one could say: Goldschmidtian gaps — because no dialect sees everything and can say everything about the psyche. Those Babel neighbourhoods, just listed, which do not derive from historic authorities, but from views onto the psyche, make this so particularly obvious.

Their names already show us what is in focus: drive, object relation, ego, or attachment. Indirectly this reveals clearly just what is not in focus. But also with the others, the -ians, we tend to know fairly well which areas of psychic experience they grasp with great sharpness and with high clarity — and what they see less clearly. Each of us is at home in his or her dialect.

With narcissistically needy patients, for instance, Kohut's work on idealising transference comes to mind, with patients with oedipal intensity drive-theoretical concepts come forcefully to the forefront, in heated affects in which yet other patients entangle us, we will surely think of the Kleinian concept of projective identification.

Such pragmatic handling of the diversity of our dialects, to experience them as enrichment, as an asset, presupposes, however, some effort: One must first of all be curious about. One must listen, read, and discuss. One must be able to acknowledge what others are saying, and one must be willing to assimilate other ideas to one's own beliefs; allow a mixing of one's own dialect with new ideas and concepts. By the way, some translations of the Bible do speak about a 'mixing' of languages, while the well-known Luther translation uses the negatively connoted 'confusion' of languages.

And to evolve this is the personal puzzle and continuous task for each analyst" Bolognini in Dreher, b, S. There can be as many personal, by all means harmonious, but also idiosyncratic analysis mixtures as there are analysts. A justified question is then: what is the overlap, what remains as common ground? From a pragmatic point of view I acknowledge that for clinicians the diversity on offer is really good, they have the choice.

And a case-dependent pluralism is by all means adequate, given the current state of our knowledge. However, neither pluralism nor eclecticism are a good resting pillow and the last word on the subject. From a theoretical point of view I acknowledge that there is a danger of too great a diversity; and a science, on the level of theory and worldviews, can and must work consequently and systematically towards convergences, mixtures, and synergies.

In the long run, an 'anything goes' would not be a good solution. The usage of all these potentials is made possible through the vagueness and complexity of the concept psyche. I come from psychology, there research has been done for years on intelligence and personality, and since that time a number of theories compete with each other, each has its. No-one there would have the idea not to talk any more about intelligence or personality.

Examples for roadsigns and stumbling blocks. Thus, let us stay with the psyche and stay 'inside our Babel'. Regarding the diversity of voices we are always dealing with translation, the manifold facets of which I will not fathom here. There are indeed various translations that we do: In the clinical situation we analysts have always been translators of the unconscious into the domain of the conscious and of language.

In the dialogue among colleagues we transport our clinical experiences into our professional language, in that dialect which we prefer. Between the dialects there is further need for translation. If we then look to our neighbouring cities, to 'outside Babel', where other sciences are also exploring the psyche and speak about it in their professional language, we are met with new tasks: when we examine if what others are doing is relevant for us, and when we want to make clear to the others what we mean.

Many tasks. Except for Babelfish, translation is very hard work. Translators are — as Camus is said to have said — 'audacious fighters who attack the tower of Babel relentlessly'. And who often perform a Sisyphean task. Luckily, like in any other town, we also have all kinds of regulating services offering orientation, for instance, our textbooks and dictionaries, and last but not least our various professional associations; and, of course, individual well-known authors seeking to integrate various dialects. Since the s authors like Kernberg have set up roadsigns, linking ego psychology with object relations theories, and currently we have authors like Antonino Ferro reading Klein, Bion, and field theory together.

One of the typical textbooks of the 70s was "The Patient and the Analyst" by Sandler, Holder and Dare ; the update, of which I collaborated on in the 90s, is itself meanwhile out-ofdate. But, also textbooks — roadsigns — are not free of Babylonian communication barriers, of stumbling blocks: at the time, upon the publisher's request, our synopsis mainly considered English-speaking authors.

From a Babylonian perspective, I regret this limitation, today. The dominance of the contemporary Freudian perspective, which was due to us authors, I would also judge critically today. While looking through the literature for the update, I also often noticed which strategic considerations were obvious in quoting. True, I had learned from C. Peirce that authority and prominence were no guarantee for quality, but then had to recognize that there really are a lot of citation cartels as Green ironically describes see.

At the time, we, too, were unfortunately not totally free from this temptation, sometimes one has to struggle quite a bit with oneself in Babel Textbooks become outdated quickly, but the diversity remains, actually it even increases. The IPA for quite a while has started initiatives in order to do better justice to communication in Babel. Let me briefly mention two of the more recent projects: A project of the IPA's clinical-research-committee wanted to work out the essentials of a good clinical research paper all across the three IPA regions North America, Latin America, and Europe.

At a congress panel, a paper from one continent was discussed from the vantage point of another continent. His version of W. Bion's theory of thought, the depth and subtlety of Ogden's clinical work, and his theoretical reflections have impressed us see Ogden, ; Dreher, At the panel we were able to show why Ogden's text was for us an example for a good clinical research paper, which does justice to the communication need "Inside Babel". Useful elements are: explication of hypotheses and of the specific theoretical frame of reference, explicit integration into the context of analytic theory development, supportive illustration by case vignettes as well as a discussion and reflection in the field of tension of theory and clinical practice.

The resonance was very positive. At the very end, however, one of those annoying Babel stumbling blocks appeared: a prominent Kleinian wanted everything to be very critically evaluated, because Ogden and us, too, failed to mention that he took major ideas from Melanie Klein.

She was right. Unfortunately, they still exist, these old road blocks, and we will still have to reckon with them in Babel. Nevertheless, our project was successful, and there are further ones, which make one optimistic. The IPA is called upon as an institution to offer orientation in this jungle of diversity. No individual analyst, clinicians in private practice far less so than researchers in institutions, has enough resources to maintain the overview.

Recently an Encyclopaedic Dictionary Project has been launched, in cooperation with working groups all over the world, with the aim to put together a dictionary of currently important concepts, which is then accessible via internet. Initially, there was no consensus about what it means to write in plain and simple language, to be understood also by interested lay persons.

As was to be expected, for some concepts the understanding initially diverged in major ways. For instance with 'countertransference' a huge range was noticeable: some regarded countertransference as an overarching term for the whole psychic participation of the analyst and thus central for the analytic process.

Others only saw individual aspects of this participation. How does one deal with such differences? For this purpose, a set of rules is currently being developed, the implementation of which, however, presupposes, that at least one acknowledges otherness. And: what can be done if a working group cannot agree on a homogeneous understanding?

Diplomats tend to say in such a case "we agree that we disagree". For the moment the Babel mode is being applied, different versions continue side by side. I would regard such a case as an indication of a Goldschmidt-gap: each version sees something different sharply. For instance, about what we want to consider 'innate' in the psyche. Or about what the relationship is between 'evenly suspended attention' and 'reverie', or about what the 'observed infant' has to do with the 'reconstructed infant'. Some would like to just leave the stress behind and wish they were in a quieter place.

It is too confusing for them at the squares "Inside Babel", perhaps simply too demanding. Those more tranquil places are the gated communities where people live who want to go back to the roots; "Back to Freud", "Back to Klein", "Back to Lacan" you may read over the entrance. The residents are convinced that there are authorities who have already said everything important, and there is actually no further need for input from outside. Such nostalgic regressions do not really fit into a science where theories and concepts are constantly in change. Psychoanalysis has no monopoly on the investigation of psychic phenomena — but our modus and our theories are unique.

Access and results of the behaviour-centered, gene-, or brain-centered approaches differ highly from our psyche-centered approach and are competing with us, scientifically, and in the health system. No one in psychoanalysis will deny that the psyche needs a brain which functions according to genetic plans, and that the psyche can also show itself in behaviour and language. The main work of the psyche, however, happens in secret. This evidently serves an evolutionary purpose, for otherwise nature would have equipped us with sign systems indicating to everyone, also to us, what is happening within us.

Reading log-files as one does with computers does not work in our case. Scans of the brain only show brain activities, and research is just on the verge of deciphering how these are connected to psychic activities. The psyche is more than a mere epi-phenomenon of brain activities about which one would no longer have to speak separately once one knew everything about the brain. Nevertheless: we must examine whether the findings about the functioning of the brain are relevant for us.

Our current most interesting interface is with the neurosciences. The title of a recent event on occasion of the presentation of the Kandel-prize in Frankfurt may illustrate this trend, as well as its dangers: "The brain on the couch. Psychoanalysis on the way into neuroscience". The first sentence, of course, is due to marketing.

I would have formulated the second sentence differently: "Psychoanalysis and neuroscience on their way towards a mutual approach". Because, after all, both could learn from each other. I definitely consider the self-surrender of psychoanalysis as just as harmful as the self-overestimation, I encountered recently at a conference: psychoanalysis would be the master science, the mother of all sciences, so-tospeak — such arrogance will certainly not bring us any recognition, let alone friends.

But the anxieties behind both defence mechanisms — devaluation as well as hybris — we should attend to ….

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The strength of neuroscience is the investigation of the brain, and neuroscience generates fascinating findings with high relevance for medicine and basic research. The hype of imaging procedures — I also like seeing coloured pictures oft the brain — is certainly due to the Zeitgeist. As trendy and modern as the neuro-approach is, it is, however, based on a materialistic reductionism which actually does not fit at all for us.

Our strength is the investigation of the psyche, for that purpose we make a number of substantial assumptions. A sheer reductionism does not work for us, because the consideration of both domains is indispensable for our work. Thus, we are dealing — beyond facts and causalities — with meaning, with the significance, for instance, of the influence of socialization and historical conditions.

Human beings are not only processing information, they generate meaning. Next, of course, there is our central assumption of unconscious structures and processes. Psychic reality, instincts and their vicissitudes, unconscious conflicts, inner object-relationships, defence mechanisms, ontogenetic points of change, etc.

The psyche is that agency that constitutes our subjectivity, our biographically grown personality, our identity. Thus the psyche is unique for every human being. At first sight, the same seems to be true for the psyche that applies to snowflakes: examined in high resolution none looks exactly like the other, because each individual snowflake shows the history of its origin and development. But there is an important difference.

Snowflakes are not culture-dependent. They have a universal pattern, a hexagon. Whether the psyche, in contrast, is the same in all cultures and functions in the same way, is at least an open question. It was Freud who characterized the methodologically most difficult feature of the psyche "Every science is based on observations and experiences arrived at through the medium of our psychical apparatus. But since our science has as its subject that apparatus itself, the analogy ends here" Freud, , S.

The limits of human self-awareness — whether and how the psyche can recognize itself — are an on-going, so far unsolved theme. Beyond that, psychoanalysis does not consider the psyche a monad, its full functionality only shows itself interpsychically in exchange with others.

We make use of this in the classic variant of analytic treatment: the psyche of the patient and that of the analyst constitute a dyad, a bi-polar field, characterised by the interwovenness of transference and countertransference, by the interplay of the patient's free association and the analyst's evenly suspended attention.

It is only in this field that the unique experiential sphere unfolds which is constitutive for our work. In a special sense we ourselves with our psyche function as a. We analysts not only give a treatment, we are an inseparable part of the treatment. Critics either do not agree with these assumptions or they criticize the lacking scientific grounding of our ideas.

And here suddenly we are with the scientific worldviews again. For, the relevance of the statement that the phenomena we investigate would be hardly observable objectively, difficult to measure and quantify, is definitely grounded in a specific view of science. Should we, however, because of this critique give up our assumptions?

Or, shouldn't we in turn criticize the scientific worldview of our critics? If we would only rely on so-called objective methods in our search for the unconscious, we might experience the same as a drunk man who lost his key and is seeking it under a lamppost. When asked by a pedestrian whether he had lost his key there, the drunk answers: No, but here I can see something.

So far to the inventory …. My sceptical optimism, that it may be possible, to put forward the project of psychoanalysis is mainly based on considerations about our traditional subject and name-giver 'psyche'. It is actually not only inspiring and interesting "inside Babel", there is also a very practical reason to stay here. It is often claimed that the real context of justification of all analytic ideas would be the clinical situation. New ideas and concepts are always tested by us on-site, regarding practicability. That this actually constantly happens, is illustrated by "natural pluralism" and eclecticism.

We could say: "What matters, is on the couch", even if not all of our patients are on the couch any longer. Our models of the psyche are unique and, I think, the best elaborated ones. We have a historically grown treasure of theoretical reflections and clinical evidences supporting our assumptions about the psyche. The complexity of the psyche is probably the essential reason why there is no 'theory of everything', one that embraces everything.

Our respective dialects, however, very discriminately grasp partial views of this holistically functioning psyche, and it would be useful to continue working on the mixing of our dialects. And yet, it is not the variety of the dialects that is the problem — for each new dialect possibly adds to the overall picture — the problem is the often observable group-dynamic separation of the dialect speakers. But, I think, in all our manifold discourses one can again and again wring the pleasant from the unpleasant. There are many, perhaps too many fields of tension: not only inside ourselves, within and between dialects, between worldviews, between clinicians and researchers, between psychoanalysis and its neighbouring sciences.

It is definitely necessary to see these fields of tension, and to see them not only as barriers but as impulses, as an inspiration and to tare them, to balance them again and again. Making oneself aware of one's own "anti-social and anti-cultural motives" alone and keeping them in awareness, demands quite some effort. It may be difficult to seek discourse in Babel, but there is only one thing that would cause more difficulties in the long run, that is, not to seek discourse at all. Bergson H. Meisenheim am Glan: Westkulturverlag Dreher A. Forum Psychoanal Dreher A. Interview mit Stefano Bolognini.

Some remarks on the intricacies of clinical research. In: Boag S. Philosophy, Science, and Psychoanalysis. London: Karnac, Freud S. SE 21 Freud S. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Green A. IJP Kernberg O. IJP Koestler A. Ein satirischer Roman. On three forms of thinking: magical thinking, dream thinking, and transformative thinking. Psychoanalytic Quarterly Peirce C. The Collected Papers Vol. I: Principles of philosophy. Sandler J. London: Karnac. Some historical and theoretical notes on the linguistic and cultural strategies implied by the foundation oft he International Journal of Psychoanalysis, and on ist relevance today.

IJP Wallerstein R. Both phdosophers, for example, explicitly argue that artist and audience alike require a certain kind and a certain degree of freedom in order to carry out their respective projects, be they creative, cognitive, or aesthetic. While Kant's interest in art is limited mostly to its aesthetic affects, i. Despite these fundamental differences, the two phdosophers' respective explanations of art and artistic autonomy must both be considered if we are to understand properly modem and post-historical forms of art, which for all their novelty and differences both real and apparent draw heavily on both the Kantian and Hegelian traditions for theh justification.

So, while Kant and Hegel may not supply us with direct or decisive ways to think through contemporary issues involving artistic freedom or questions concerning the moral legitimacy of art, they can help us map out the historical landscape of philosophical thought on art and artistic autonomy and thereby provide us with the prolegomena to such an effort.

Ang, Jennifer Mei Sze. This paper seeks to clarify the basis, the nature, and the extent of our duty-to-others in the situations specified by R2P by bringing together current concerns and discussions surrounding the conceptualization of R2P as an imperfect duty. I begin by demonstrating that our imperfect duties to others are not optional, that Kantian imperfect duty is relevant to the discussion on R2P if read correctly, and that R2P must not be converted to perfect duties for meritorious deeds and what it mean to be a virtuous person to remain meaningful.

Next, I discuss the scope of our duty-to-others, primarily regarding the limitations that we ought to observe when framing specific R2P operational duties. I argue that Kantian ethics must guide political and military responses to human catastrophes in order to ensure humanitarian ends are achieved. Anthony, Zoe. Godlove Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review , Aquila, Richard E. Philosophical Review Aramayo, Roberto R. Araujo Figueiredo de, Virginia. It means that empirical psychology should be considered scholastic theoretical anthropology and should be further developed to constitute an autonomous research field.

In addition, we show that there is also a strong link between theoretical knowledge of empirical psychology and anthropology considered from the pragmatic point of view. My examination gives the same importance to each one of these dimensions and aims to reconstruct the relationships between them in order to show that they can be integrated in a single and consistent theory.

These three dimensions are: 1 the requirement to introduce theoretical concepts and objects; 2 the necessity to use criteria for the formation, admission and evaluation of hypotheses of empirical laws in general and the theoretical and empirical concepts these laws refer to; 3 the demand of systematicity for the knowledge of the understanding. The connection between 1 and 2 lies in the fact that theoretical concepts and objects demanded by 1 need to be assessed according to the criteria required by 2.

As regards 3 , the demand for systematicity can also be understood as one of the criteria required by 2 , though it is more complex than the others and presupposes them. Arndt, Martin. Audi, Robert. Aufderheide, Joachim, and Ralf M. Bader, eds. The Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant. Robert B. Auweele, Dennis vanden. After first clearly distinguishing between a cognitive and a conative aspect of moral education, I show how certain historical religious practices serve to provide the conative aspect of moral education.

By this it is meant that certain practices can inspire moral interests either by justifying rational hope in living up to a certain standard of moral perfection Christology or by endeavouring to unite human beings in a universal, invisible ethical community that inspires cooperation rather than adversity ecclesiology. Ayas Onol, Tugba. From the first Critique to the third Critique, the imagination emerges under different titles such as reproductive, productive or transcendental imagination. Thus, it will examine of the power and the scope of the imagination in the first Critique and of its status and performance in the third Critique.

Azevedo, Marco Antonio. Baas, Bernard. Kant himself suggested the analogy. The question to be asked then is that of knowing what is the subject of this jouissance, and what jouissance precisely.

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The confrontation with the Flying Dutchman, the hero of the Wagnerian drama, can open up the possibility to answer this question, which is, as shown by Alenka Zupancic, also the Kantian question. Bachour, Omar. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review online 11 Dec Bacin, Stefano. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. Baciu, Claudiu. Bader, Ralf M. Joachim Aufderheide and Ralf M. Bader op cit. See : Aufderheide, Joachim, and Ralf M. Bagnoli, Carla. Baiasu, Sorin. Comparing Kant and Sartre. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, The Bloomsbury Companion to Kant. London: Bloomsbury Academic, Barbosa, Ricardo.

Barney, Rachel. Baron, Marcia. Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson op cit. Barry, Peter Brian. I argue that while there is a Kantian case against torture, Kantian ethics does not clearly entail absolutism about torture. I consider several arguments for a Kantian absolutist position concerning torture and explain why none are sound. I close by clarifying just what the Kantian case against torture is. My contention is that while Kantian ethics does not support a variety of moral absolutism about torture, it does suggest a strong version of legal absolutism. Basile, Giovanni Pietro.

Basso, Elisabetta. Basterra, Gabriela. The Subject of Freedom: Kant, Levinas. New York: Fordham University Press, What different thinking conditions, I ask, does this antinomy open up for reason even to entertain any possibility of success? Reason's ability to form a synthesis depends on acknowledging the role in Kant's argument of a subject that does not need to be envisioned as a standpoint — whether intelligible or empirical, as Kant's explicit solution has it — but, rather, as the site of a relationship between the series and its outside.

We may call it "unconditioned subjectivity," clarifying from the outset that subjectivity in this sense names a structural position that plays an exceptional role in the series: it is the element that exceptionally introduces a boundary, a fleeting moment of closure. Unconditioned subjectivity would name the relationship and boundary that anchor the phenomenal series time and again. I argue, moreover, that the synthesis of causality forming here coheres as a dynamic system that is not stable or self-contained but, rather, contingent and "in progress.

Baum, Manfred. Rainer Enskat op cit. Baxley, Anne Margaret. Johnson Kantian Review Beade, Ileana P. Beck, Gunnar, and Tao Huang. Beijing: Shang wu yin Shu guan, Benson, Bruce Ellis. At least for Kant, maturity which is to say 'enlightenment' comes about when one is able to think for oneself. Contrary to Kant, and even contrary to Michael Foucault, who writes a nearly equally famous response to Kant's essay, maturity is something that goes beyond the stage which Kant labels 'enlightenment'. In the end, the problem with both Kant and Foucault is not that they are too critical.

Rather they are not critical enough. Berger, Larissa. Bernardini, Sandro. Lezioni di sociologia: Vico e Kant. Rome: Armando, Beyleveld, Deryck. This attribution is unfounded and Korsgaard's own argument for moral obligation, in its appeal to Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument to establish that reasons for action are essentially public, is misdirected and unnecessary. Gewirth's attempt to demonstrate a strictly a priori connection between a moral principle and the concept of being an agent as such is essentially Kantian, and recognizing that the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives is categorically binding requires Kantians to accept that Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency is the supreme practical principle.

In other words, exercising the power of judgment is implicated whenever we try to bring together the ethical issue of strictly determining our actions on the one hand and the necessity to act in the physical world on the other. We will argue that this mediating function is properly understood only if the ideations produced by self-understanding are characterized as objects of rationally required hope or fear. Biasetti, Pierfrancesco. The paper is divided in four parts. Bickmann, Claudia. Posesorski Philosophy as consensus.

Popularphilosophie in systematischer Absicht. Bird, Graham. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern op cit. Biss, Mavis. I seek to address this problem in a way that avoids the flaws of synchronic and atomistic approaches to moral self-discipline by developing an account of Kantian moral striving as an ongoing contemplative activity complexly engaged with multiple forms of self-knowledge. Bader Blomme, Henny. Robert R. Clewis op cit. This brings us to a reconsideration of the role of the transcendental ideas. Although the latter do lack objective reality, they are not without value for objectivity.

Indeed, the human quest for knowledge can only lead to objective cognitions if the latter are embedded in a system that is ultimately grounded on an idea of reason itself. However, it would be uncompromising to allow for only two possibilities: either full responsibility or none. Moreover, in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant himself claims that there can be degrees of responsibility, depending on the magnitude of the obstacles that have to be overcome when acting. The solution is based on the distinction between two senses of responsibility: taking oneself to be an accountable person is an all-or-nothing affair, whereas praise- or blameworthiness for a particular action can still be a matter of degree.

Bohnet, Clayton. Logic and the Limits of Philosophy in Kant and Hegel. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, Bojanowski, Jochen. Kant interpreters have been baffled by this claim, and the disagreement among the increasing number of studies in more recent years suggests that the table is not as straightforward as Kant took it to be.

I believe the task of disambiguating the table in all three cases can be completed. According to Sensen, the standard interpretation is based on the assumption that Kant endorses Moorean moral intutionism. This leads to the false view that we must first perceive that other human beings have value and then infer that we ought to respect them. Against this standard interpretation Sensen claims that Kant endorses moral prescriptivism. In this paper I want to agree with Sensen that Kant was not a moral intuitionist. The unargued presupposition is that the object has to be something other than the cognizing subject itself.

I believe that Sensen ultimately does not sufficiently appreciate the fact that the moral law is the form of practical cognition. Prescriptivism only claims that a certain action is rational, but it does not explain why we perform it. Since the inner worth of a good action as well as the inner worth of humanity as such depends on practical cognition a priori, I do not see any reason why we should resist the claim that Kant ascribes an absolute or inner metaphysical value property both to humanity and to particular morally good actions.

My paper comes in three parts. I then argue that moral constructivism does not have the voluntarist or subjectivist implications Sensen takes it to have, and that is much closer to the position he sympathizes with. Finally I show on textual grounds why Kant did in fact ascribe an absolute value to humanity and to morally good actions. Bolduc, Carl R. Kant et Spinoza: Rencontre paradoxale. Bonaccini, Juan A. Bonella, Alcino Eduardo. Bonnet, Christian. Books, Julie N. New York: Peter Lang Verlag, Borges, Maria. Bouillon, Hardy, ed.

Boxill, Bernard, and Jan Boxill. Boyle, Matthew. Bozzo, Alexander. Kant-Studien Brandom, Robert B. From Empiricism to Expressivism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Brandt, Reinhard. A revolution leads to a fundamental change: where the subject once had to follow external determinations, he now subdues objects via his own legislation. Heteronomy becomes autonomy. Kant organizes the revolutions in an order that follows not the empirical facts of history, but the structure of philosophical reason.

The two most important texts are the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason and the second chapter of the Conflict of the Faculties Brauer, Daniel. Braverman, Charles. Those images did not faithfully depict Kantianism but they described what French philosophers knew about Kant and they had some influence on the development of French philosophy at the time.

It was influenced by the genetic approach in order to explain all our ideas from experience, by the interpretation of experience as conscious effects of senses and also by the necessity of making and classifying experimentations. French empiricism was then especially characterised by a physiological and medical approach very interested in conscious efforts which were regarded as the beginning of the genesis of human intelligence.

The French reception of Kantianism and its opposition to it reveal those characteristics of a French empiricism. However, this reception of Kantian philosophy was not only made of oppositions. Breazeale, Daniel. Breitenbach, Angela. But how, exactly, should we conceive of the character of beauty in mathematics? In this paper I suggest that Kant's philosophy provides the resources for a compelling answer to this question. The Kantian proposal I thus develop provides a promising alternative to Platonist accounts of beauty widespread among mathematicians.

While on the Platonist conception the experience of mathematical beauty consists in an intellectual insight into the fundamental structures of the universe, according to the Kantian proposal the experience of beauty in mathematics is grounded in our felt awareness of the imaginative processes that lead to mathematical knowledge. The Kantian account I develop thus offers to elucidate the connection between aesthetic reflection, creative imagination and mathematical cognition.

Bresolin, Keberson. This process is fundamental because it will allow humanity lead rationally itself, the structures that builds and manages under the auspices of reason. Bristow, William. Brook, Andrew. Bruno, G. This poses two problems. Pablo Muchnik and Oliver Thorndike op cit. Buchheim, Thomas. Thereby, certain ontological main features of subject-independently existing things and beings, such as the feature of being based on an ontology of spatially existing bodies, and being descended from an evolving overall context of causally connected processes, are speculatively derived from the initial idea of existence that is to be presupposed to all sciences.

Bueno, Vera Cristina de Andrade. The paper stresses that, it is in the effort of well exposing in public its own ideas, that reason can develop itself concernig its growing autonomy. Bunke, Simon, and Katerina Mihaylova, eds. Burbulla, Julia. Bielefeld: transcript, Busch, Kevin R. This problem is that induction cannot be justified so long as it presupposes some empirical concept applying to or some empirical principle true of more than one object in nature, a presupposition neither determined by nor founded on reason. Byrd, B. Cachel, Andrea.

As to the remission of the supersensible substrate of nature, it will be object of this text point out the relations between aesthetic judgment and teleological judgment, by the point of view of the relation between these judgments with morality in Kant. Thus, in what extent the idea of systematicity permeates the analysis of the natural beauty and how the moral sense of this systematicity involves the issue of the encounter between the multiplicity of intuition and the legality of knowledge, also present in the analysis of teleological judgment, it will be one of the privileged themes on display.

Similarly, as the natural beauty allows the analogy with art and in what extent this involves or do not involves the presumption of an external intentionality to nature, it will be the subject of this discussion. Finally, in the comparison between aesthetic and teleological judgment, we will point out how the notions of organized organism and final cause, causes that required by the reflective judgment to explain these natural species as distinct of mechanisms, authorizes the assumption of a finality in beauty forms, which has certain consequences for some important aspects of Kant's moral philosophy which we bottom to expose.

Caimi, Mario. Cajthami, Martin. Notoriously, Kant, in his practical philosophy, leaves hardly any place for the moral value of emotions. According to Aristotle, emotions can be object of praise and blame in so far as they are formed by good or bad habits moral virtues and vices. This analysis implies that emotions can be morally good or bad in still diff erent sense than the one considered by Aristotle.


Calhoun, Cheshire. Callanan, John J. Insole Religious Studies Caranti, Luigi. Carl, Wolfgang. Carson, Emily, and Lisa Shabel, eds. Kant: Studies on Mathematics in the Critical Philosophy. London: Routledge, These chapters originally appeared as articles in an issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy , vol.

Caruso, Francisco and Roberto Moreira Xavier. Indeed, it is argued that this text does not yield a satisfactory explanation of space dimensionality, and actually restricts itself to justifying the tridimensionality of extension. From this, our purpose in this paper is to try to clarify how the feeling of respect connects figures as practical reason, moral value and autonomy, both from a historical perspective as hermeneutics of Kantian texts.

Cauchi, Mark. In my paper I attempt to re-conceive what agency is in light of this emphasis placed on otherness. I undertake this reconsideration through an analysis of the concepts of unconditionality in Kant and of conditioning by the other in Levinas. Through these analyses I arrive at a new concept: the unconditioning of the agent by the other.

I then provide some description of this concept by considering the interpretation of the theological concept of creation in Augustine, Kant, and Levinas. Cavallar, Georg. British Journal for the History of Philosophy Cecchinato, Giorgia. Chaly, Vadim. However, it is hardly a success. Chance, Brian A. The first is whether Kant believes Locke merely anticipates his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or also believes Locke anticipates his notion of synthetic a priori cognition.

This omission is surprising since his discussion of discipline in the first Critique is not only more extensive and expansive in scope than his other discussions but also predates them. The goal of this essay is to provide a comprehensive reading of the Discipline that emphasizes its systematic importance in the first Critique.

I argue that its goal is to establish a set of rules for the use of pure reason that, if followed, will mitigate and perhaps even eliminate our tendency to make judgments about supersensible objects. Since Kant's justification for these rules relies crucially on claims he has defended in the Doctrine of Elements, I argue further that, far from being a dispensable part of the Critique as commentators have tended to claim, the Discipline is, in fact, the culmination of Kant's critique of metaphysics.

Chevalier, Jean-Marie. Filozofia Oswiecenia: Radykalizm, Religia, Kosmopolityzm. Wolter i Kant, pp. Cholbi, Michael. However, some interpreters have recently argued for a Kantian view of the morality of suicide with surprising, even radical, implications. More specifically, they have argued that Kantianism 1 requires that those with dementia or other rationality-eroding conditions end their lives before their condition results in their loss of identity as moral agents and 2 requires subjecting the fully demented or those confronting future dementia to non-voluntary euthanasia.

Properly understood, Kant's ethics have neither of these implications. Chung, Jihae. To this purpose, the sublime will be referred to in the film heuristically as the Cinematic Sublime. So the different modes of experiencing of the Cinematic Sublime can be described as filmic emotions. As a consequence, the phenomenon of the Cinematic Sublime is a textually constructed sensation, which can be analyzed with the help of textual analysis. Third, the Cinematical Sublime can be experienced through intersubjective activities of the audience during film reception, requiring a high degree of imagination, empathy and constitutive perception.

Thus, I am undertaking a film-philosophical investigation that can be described as an analysis of film emotions based upon the textuality of film. Cicatello, Angelo. Only thus is it possible theoretically to access in an informed way the main sense of the Kantian cosmopolitical project and the theme of universal hospitality. And this is perhaps the way in which Kant himself, in responding to the urgent issues of his day, can indirectly provide us too with decisive suggestions for working out concrete proposals on the issue of hospitality and pacific cohabitation among peoples.

Clewis, Robert R. The Case of Physical Geography. Coelho Fragelli, Isabel. Coenen, Ludwig. Der Mensch — ein Animal Rationabile? Berlin: LIT, Cohen, Alix. Conant, James F. Consenso Tonetto, Milene. Cornell, Drucilla. While deeply sympathetic with his critique of John Rawls I also argue that the role of the Kantian imagination is extremely important in figuring ideals of justice, which must guide "realization-focused comparison"".

Cosio, Sonia. Il Rispetto in Kant. Un Sentimento Particolare. Costa Rego, Pedro. Croitoru, Rodica. Anul It is argued the part the critique of rational psychology plays as a short view on the whole transcendental system, making openings to the following two Critiques , and even to the Religion in the Bounds of Mere Reason. And last, but not least, it opens the way to the mind philosophy, at the crossroads of psychology of brain and philosophy of cognition.

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In honorem Alexandru Boboc. Vasilescu Bucarest: Ed. Cunha, Bruno. For intellectualism, a theory of natural law should not ground the concept of obligation in the authority of laws established as an arbitrary decree of God and in their coercive power interpreted as fear of punishment , but in the idea of moral necessity , understood as an expression of the universal natural connection of rational beings with duty. Kant undertook to go beyond Wolff and Baumgarten through a conceptual review of the problem, which culminated in the assumptions of his mature ethics.

Cunico, Gerardo. The basic arguments of this reconstruction are presented and discussed by examining the manner in which Kant re-elaborates the notion of the world as the unity of finite beings, conceivable only as a purposive harmony. Cureton, Adam. One place Kantians should look for inspiration is, surprisingly, the utilitarian tradition and its emphasis on generally accepted, informally enforced, publicly known moral rules of the sort that help us give assurances, coordinate our behavior, and overcome weak wills.

Kantians have tended to ignore utilitarian discussions of such rules mostly because they regard basic moral principles as a priori requirements that cannot be tailored to human foibles and limitations. I argue that Kantian moral theories should incorporate public moral rules as mid-level moral requirements for embodied and socially embedded human agents. I explain how certain specific moral judgments about how we ought to act are justified by public moral rules, which are themselves justified by more fundamental moral requirements.

Morality and Life: Kantian Perspectives in Bioethics. Pisa: Edizioni ETS, Dancy, Jonathan.

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Darwall, Stephen. Darnell, Michelle. De Araujo Figueiredo, Virginia, ed. De Bianchi, Silvia. De Boer, Karin. De Duve, Thierry. De Haro Romo, Vicente. Translated into English by Erik Norvelle. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, Afterwards, I point out how Fichte, in his Doctrine of Morals , accepts the duties to oneself, but relocates them within the system of duties. Finally, I suggest that the Fichtean reinterpretation emerges from a confusion over the role of the first-person moral agent in the Kantian ideal of the Kingdom of ends.

De Quincey, Thomas. Valladolid: Trasantier, De Warren, Nicolas, and Andrea Staiti, eds. New Approaches to Neo-Kantianism. Dean, Richard. Deleuze, Gilles. Denis, Lara. German Studies Review Diaconu, Mircea. The main stages of interpretation are being followed, while pointing out the lack of rigor in the Kantian critical discourse regarding certain matters. These matters are related to the category of limitation or the disjunctive judgment and the category of community. At the same time we will put forward some objections concerning Romanian philosopher's interpretation showing that the problem of ontological interpretation of the categorical table remains open to newer, more determined and rigorous approaches.

Dias, Maria Cristina Longo Cardoso. The position taken in this paper is that, for Bentham and Kant, law is grounded in the same principles which are the basis of ethics. Although both authors have established only one principle on which to ground ethics and law, there are several differences between the two fields and between the theories of the two philosophers. Among these differences, we mention the epistemological origin of principles and their prescriptions.

From these perspective the linguistical-dialogic, and not so the psychological, it is to be revealed like the true floor of the anthropological experience. DiCenso, James. Insofar as grace is understood in ways that assimilate it to endeavors to win favor, it works against our capacity to follow the moral law. On the constructive side, insofar as the concept of grace is understood to support ethical practice based on the moral law, it can be a vehicle for what Kant calls rational religion. This two-sided analysis of grace is a key component of the project of the Religion and other related writings, wherein Kant offers both critical and constructive investigations of historically-formed religious ideas found in scripture, ecclesiastical institutions and other sources.

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Michaleson Dillon, Robin S. Dobe, Jennifer K. Doran, Robert. The Theory of the Sublime from Longinus to Kant. Ein verborgener Widerstreit bei Kant. Knowing, Feeling, Desiring Self-Possession. Dorrien, Gary J. Dotti, Jorge E. Driver, Julia. Wolter i Kant. Paris: Ellipses, Dumitrescu, Petre. Dunn, Nicholas. This question is significant given that Kant raises this criticism against libertarianism in his early writings on freedom before coming to adopt a libertarian view of freedom in the Critical period.

I go on to show how the resources for a refutation of chance only come about in the practical philosophy. In the 2nd Critique , Kant famously argues for the reality of freedom on the basis of our consciousness of the moral law as the law of a free will. However, Kant also comes to build into his account of the will a genuine power of choice, which involves the capacity to deviate from the moral law. I conclude by showing that this apparent tension can be resolved by turning to his argument for the impossibility of a diabolical will.

This involves a consideration of the distinct kind of grounding relationship that practical laws have to the human will, as well as the way that transcendental idealism makes this possible. Duverney, Claude. Dyck, Corey W. Earle, Robert. This interpretation can be called into question via an analysis of the moral and cultural aspects of pre-Kantian and Kantian aesthetics of nature, appealing, in particular, to the works of Lord Shaftesbury, John Dennis, and Joseph Addison.

The main focus is on an explication of what this common contemporary interpretation of aesthetic history has to say about contemporary aesthetic theory.

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The pre-Kantian aesthetics of nature is so radically different from the work of these recent theorists that it is inaccurate to link members from those periods together as allies. Edgar, Scott. Ehrsam, Raphael. Eisfeld, Jens. Erkenntnis, Rechtserzeugung und Staat bei Kant und Fichte. Tubingen: Mohr Seibeck, Elismar, Alves dos Santos. Engstrom, Stephen. Enskat, Rainer. Kant y el centro cognitivo de la subjetividad que juzga. The so-called circularity of self-consciousness is irrelevant to this form of self-consciousness. Urteil und Erfahrung: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung.

Vigo Kategoriale Synthesis und Einheit des Bewusstseins. Erdle, Birgit R. Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, Immanuil Kant — nas Zemljak i Sovremennik. Espinoza, Tania. If Encore invites a passage from a masculine to a feminine position within discourse, this involves moving from the mathematical to the dynamic class of conflicts in the antinomy, from the point of view of the theoretical or speculative to that of practical reason. Esteves, Julio.

I dealt with the first interpretative tendency in a previous paper. Euler, Werner. These are the ideas of moral freedom , justice and citizenship. Through the demonstration of that fundamental relationship I will examine and comment critically on some kantian theses belonging to the centre of his theory of right and state. Moreover, I will defend his position against some recent interpretations proposed by modern authors, concerning the systematic linkage and independence between right and ethics.

In my opinion, the critique of those authors are based on misunderstandings and cannot be justified completely. Fabbianelli, Faustino. Faggion, Andrea. An a priori right may be acquired or innate. That only one innate right is freedom. As a moral right, such a right implies reciprocity. This paper aims to clarify a few issues regarding our innate right to freedom. I will claim that such an independence should be understood as absence from fraud and violence. Following, it is in order to analyze the condition according to which freedom is a right: coexistence with the freedom of every other in accord with a universal law.

I will claim that such a condition does not imply political authority. Finally, we have to handle the connection between the innate right to freedom and our humanity. I will claim that the innate right to freedom cannot be disconnected from the second formula of the categorical imperative. Fahmy, Melissa Seymour. Falduto, Antonino. Falkenbach, Tiago Fonseca. By an ontological interpretation I understand a reconstruction of the argument which tries to justify the principle by means of considerations about the reality or nature of time, rather than through considerations about the semantic or epistemic relations to this reality.

I shall argue that the ontological interpretation is preferable to the more usual, semantical and epistemological varieties, because. Fantasia, Francesca. Il tempo dell'agire libero: Dimensioni della filosofia pratica di Kant. Pisa: ETS, Feldhaus, Charles. Based on an epigram of Schiller many critics of the ethics of Kant said that Kant offers no place to feelings in ethics. However, this scenario has changed in recent years with several members of the Kant-Forschung highlighting the role that Kant gives virtue and feelings in his later works. Therefore, this study seeks to show how duty and inclination plays an important role in the ethical conceptions of Schiller and Kant.

Moreover, Schiller raises some objections against the ethics of Kant and this study aims to outline some answers from Kant to these objections in works such as The Metaphysics of Morals , Vorarbeiten zur Religion and Vorlesungen zur Moralphilosophie. Feldman, Karen. Simon Bunke and Katerina Mihaylova op cit. Feloj, Serena. Fenves, Peter. The basic premise for that distinction is the Kantian defense of the necessity of regarding the human action from the twofold point of view, empiric concerning the effects of action e intelligible with regard the causes.

Ferraguto, Federico. Ferrara, Alessandro. It did not appear before the Axial Age, and in its extreme form as a realm of ultimate meanings beyond human reach it had only a locally and temporally bounded existence. Once it appeared, however, the idea of religious transcendence set an evolutionary dynamic in motion, which soon led to various forms of immanent transcendence, starting from the Papal Revolution and continuing with the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the Kantian notion of the transcendental and its Hegelian and Habermasian modifications.

Ferrara, Luca. Giuseppe Giannetto op cit. Ferrari, Jean. Ferrarin, Alfredo. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Ferraris, Maurizio. Ferreira, Arthur Arruda Leal. For that the text will be divided in two parts. In the first part we will examine the contributions of Kantian critique to the constitution of a psychological project: psychology as a science of experience, referring to the work developed in the first psychological laboratories in the end of the 19th century.

The hypothesis proposed is that the Kantian critiques of 18th century psychology are more important to the psychology of the 19th and 20th century than his positive assessments regarding this field. At the conclusion we propose a discussion of the political sense of these critical appropriations in the history of psychology.

Feuerhahn, Niels. Dialogue , published online 20 Nov Fichant, Michel. Fierens, Christian. They relate directly to the phenomena that are present in the treatment; in this sense, they come under the first part of the Kantian transcendental logic, i. Fincham, Richard Mark. It thus shows how Maimon and Schelling — within and , respectively — sketch systems of transcendental philosophy explicitly modelled on the Leibnizian philosophy, which both of them interpret as claiming that God is immanently contained within the human soul.

Fine, Robert. Perspectives on Politics Finkelde, Dominik. Firestone, Chris L. Pasternack Fischer, Norbert. Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Freiburg: Herder, Fisher, Naomi. Review of Metaphysics Flach, Werner. Kant zu Geschichte, Kultur und Recht. Edited by Wolfgang Bock. Fleischacker, Sam. Both of these ways of abandoning reason can be fended off if we always submit our private thoughts to the test of public scrutiny: which is why enlightenment, for Kant, requires both free thinking, by each individual for him or herself, and a realm of free public expression in which individuals can discuss the results of their thinking.

After analyzing the constructivist Kantianism of Christine Korsgaard, we propose an alternative: that of grounding normativity solely on the idea of freedom, as an internal value or non-normative absolute, as Kant understands it. This proposal makes it possible to outline a Neo-Kantianism that articulates constructivist and realist models on the sole basis of the idea of freedom. Flynn, Thomas R. Foreman, Elizabeth. Ultimately, it is not the robust rational autonomy that Kant suggests, but rather the basic subjectivity that underlies it being the subject-of-a-life.

Since this subjectivity is shared by nonhuman animals, they are owed respect as well. Forgione, Luca. Forster, Michael. Foster, Jay. The paper argues that this is because Kant is concerned less with elucidating his concept of Enlightenment and more with characterizing a political condition that might provide the conditions for the possibility of Enlightenment. This paper calls this political condition modernity and it is achieved when civil order can be maintained alongside fractious and possibly insoluble public disagreement about matters of conscience, including the nature and possibility of Enlightenment.

Kant enjoins and advises the prince that discord and debate about matters of conscience need not entail any political unrest or upheaval. Franceschet, Antonio. Second, having been constructed as a supranational substitute for domestic legal authority, the ICC has been subverted by other, political branches of the state, such as the executive.

Franzel, Sean. Eighteenth-Century Studies Freudenthal, Gideon. Friedlander, Eli. Cambridge, Mass. Friedmann Michael. Kant ve Kesin Bilimler. Istanbul: Alfa Basim Yayim, Frierson, Patrick R. Wood Having immersed himself in Western conceptions of aethetics, literature, social sciences, politics, and philosophy while living in Japan, he introduced this newly acquired knowledge to the Chinese reading public. Fugate, Courtney D. The problem, briefly, is about how Kant can hold moral evil to be imputable when he also seems to hold that freedom is found only in moral actions.

The paper then argues that this strategy is not supported by the text and indeed proves to be contrary to other arguments that are central to Kant's moral thought. Funaba, Yasuyuki, ed. Gabriel, Markus, ed. Gagliano, Giuseppe. La Filosofia Politica Kantiana. Rome: Armando Editore, A Kantian Answer, an Institutionalist Alternative. Using Kantian critical philosophy, we argue, on the contrary, that neoclassical economics is based on certain ethical postulates, and thus it cannot obtain the status of science.

Although ethics is but one of the many institutions that affect economics, it plays a major role in setting the basis on which to build its entire theoretical structure. Approaching the analysis from institutionalism places ethical issues at the forefront of economic debate, thus opening the door to future dialogue between disciplines and analytical approaches. Gardner, Sebastian. The Transcendental Turn. Henry E.

Nietzsche on Instinct and

The primacy of poetry in the CJ needs to obey a prior aesthetic theory that equates the taste with the correspondence between sensitivity and reason consubstantial to any judgment of knowledge. Garrido Wainer, Juan Manuel. My aim is to show that the third Critique offers a relevant theoretical framework to explore the limits and scopes of experimental practice in life sciences.

Kantian and Neo-Kantian approaches reject any mode of knowing living nature based on vitalistic intuitions of inner life and indirect lived experience. Garthoff, Jon. I then argue this program should be continued further, to provide not only a virtue-based account of moral judgment but also a virtue-based account of moral worth. I make a case that this fusion of Kantian theory with virtue theory provides the best account of moral rules, and I close by suggesting that it generates a promising new understanding of moral rights.

Gaus, Gerald. Gava, Gabriele. I will first consider how some commentators have accounted for Kant's distinction and analyze some passages in which Kant defined the analytic and the synthetic method. I will suggest that confusion about Kant's distinction arises because he uses it in at least two different senses. I will then identify a specific way in which Kant accounts for this distinction when he is differentiating between mathematical and philosophical syntheses. I will examine Kant's arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason with the latter sense of the distinction in mind.

I will evaluate if he uses the analytic or the synthetic method and if the synthetic method is able to identify, without a previous consideration of some sort of given knowledge, sufficient conditions for deriving some aspects of our knowledge. Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy.

New York: Routledge, Geiger, Ido. As a response to his paper, I focus on two important issues that nevertheless separate us: 1 Sticker claims that knowing our duty can be mere passive awareness and that it indeed is passive as awareness of the special status of humanity.

I deny that knowing our duty is ever passive. I argue that Sticker appears to construe universalization as a formal test that presupposes no moral knowledge and that so construed the test cannot serve for acquiring moral knowledge. Gerhardt, Volker. Beijing: Zhong guo she hui ke xue chu ban she, Vernunft und Leben Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, Gerlach, Burkhard. German, Andy. Yet his description of this metaphysics for a new era reveals its surprisingly Platonic affinities.

Giannetto, Giuseppe. Intelletto e ragione in Kant e Schopenhauer. Gilicka, Magdalena. Konzept der Erscheinungswelt. Ginsborg, Hannah. Godioli, Alberto. Goldberg, Nathaniel Jason. Kantian Conceptual Geography. Golob, Sacha. Gondek Hans-Dieter. Gondim, Elnora, and Osvaldino Marra Rodrigues. In the first part section 1 , I shall expound the kantian concept of paradox and its three different senses, the anthropological, the rhetorical and the metaphysical.